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An Analysis of Pennsylvania's Legislative
Programs for Financially Distressed
Municipalities and the Reaction of
Municipal Labor Unions
I. Introduction
In response to the growing problem of financial distress in
Pennsylvania's municipalities, the State's General Assembly has passed
two comprehensive programs to help its boroughs, towns, and cities out
of fiscal trouble.' The first piece of legislation, the Municipalities
Financial Recovery Act, more commonly known as Act 47, was enacted
in 1987 and focuses mainly on smaller communities whose ailing
economies had depended largely on the disappearing steel industry.
2
Then, in 1991, economic woes caught up to the State's largest city,
Philadelphia, which faced imminent bankruptcy and certain default on its
bond payments.I In response, the legislature hurriedly passed the
Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperative Authority Act (Act 6),
designed to assist the city whose needs go far beyond the scope of Act
47.4 Both acts provide municipalities with varying forms of assistance
in exchange for different levels of state intervention into the financial
planning of the distressed municipalities .' Labor unions have questioned
the validity of this state intervention and have challenged the legality of
both acts on many grounds in the courts of Pennsylvania. 6
This Comment analyzes the above legislation through recent case
law and assesses its impact on the municipalities of Pennsylvania. Part
II of this Comment analyzes Act 47 in terms of its purpose, its
provisions, and its powers. Part III delves into the labor issues raised by
Act 47, focusing on specific challenges to various aspects of the
legislation. Part IV discusses Act 6, highlighting the changes and
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 11701.101-.501 (Supp. 1993) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§
12720.101-709 (Supp. 1993).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 11701.101-.501 (Supp. 1993). Act 69 of 1992, made certain
amendments to Act 47, the most important of which was to change the title from the Financially
Distressed Municipalities Act to Municipalities Financial Recovery Act. The change is intended to
provide a less intimidating title and to reduce the stigma attached to municipalities seeking the relief
afforded by Act 47.
3. PeterCooney, Philadelphia Plaguedby Financial Crisis, ReuterBus. Rep., Sept. 10, 1990,
at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 12720.101-.709 (Supp. 1993).
5. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 11701.101-.501 (Supp. 1993) with PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53 §§ 12720.101-.709(Supp. 1993).
6. See discussion infra, parts III, V.
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improvements made by the legislature because of the experiences with
Act 47. Part V examines labor's latest challenge to this state
intervention, which also reflects lessons learned from the litigation of Act
47. Part VI analyzes the effectiveness of both Act 47 and Act 6 and
discusses additional action that municipalities must take to become
fiscally strong. Part VII concludes with an evaluation of labor's
recourse, the actual impact of the legislation on the municipalities, and
the future of state-municipality relations.
II. Act 47
Act 47, Pennsylvania's first legislative recognition of the growing
problem of municipal distress, was primarily a response to the problems
experienced by small communities in western Pennsylvania that were
devastated by the evaporation of jobs due to the decline in the steel
industry.7 As of 1992, ten of the twelve municipalities determined to be
distressed were located in western Pennsylvania.8  The economy,
however, is not the sole cause of the financial problems. Fiscal
mismanagement and administrative inefficiency have also contributed to
the problems. 9
A. Provisions and Powers of Act 47
Act 47 provides criteria for evaluating the fiscal stability of
municipalities and procedures for helping the communities regain their
fiscal stability.'" Specifically, the Act empowers the Department of
Community Affairs (DCA) to monitor all of the State's municipalities by
authorizing the compilation of financial data." Armed with this
information, the DCA evaluates the data under eleven indicators of
possible distress outlined in the Act. 2 If any or all of the criteria are
7. DEPARTMENT OF PUB. ADMIN., GRADUATE SCH. OF PUB. POLICY AND ADMIN. AT PA.
STATE UNIV., COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS IN PENNSYLVANIA'S LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A
PROGRAM EVALUATION OF ACT 47, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA (1991)
[hereinafter COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS].
8. DEPARTMENTOF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, MUN. PROGRAMS Div., STATUS REPORT 2 (Aug.
31, 1992) [hereinafter STATUS REPORT].
9. COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS, supra note 7, at 11.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.102 (Supp. 1993). Numerous other states have passed
legislation addressing the problem of municipal financial distress, including Florida, Illinois, Maine,
Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Ohio. COPING WITH FISCAL
DISTRESS, supra note 7, at app. 4. For a summary of the plans of these states, see id.
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 11701.121-.123 (Supp. 1993).
12. These factors are:
1. The municipality has maintained a deficit over a three year period, with a deficit
of 1 % or more in each of the previous fiscal years.
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met, the DCA has the discretion, upon weighing all of the evidence, to
declare a municipality distressed. 3 Upon such a determination, the
DCA must appoint a coordinator who will develop and implement a plan
designed to correct the fiscal problems of the municipality." The
municipality has the option of rejecting the plan and formulating its own,
but it must still obtain the DCA's approval of the plan in order to avoid
substantial penalties.' 5 Not only can the DCA withhold the assistance
provided in Act 47, it may also withhold regular state funding, subject
to a few exceptions.' 6
2. The municipality's expenditures have exceeded revenues for a period of three years
or more.
3. The municipality has defaulted in payment of principal or interest on any of its
bonds or notes or in payment of rentals due any authority.
4. The municipality has missed a payroll for 30 days.
5. The municipality has failed to make required payments to judgment creditors for
30 days beyond the date of the recording of the judgment.
6. The municipality, for a period of at least 30 days beyond the due date, has failed
to forward taxes withheld on the income of employees or has failed to transfer
employer or employee contributions for Social Security.
7. The municipality has accumulated and has operated for each of two successive
years a deficit equal to 5% or more of its revenues.
8. The municipality has failed to make the budgeted payment of its minimum
municipal obligation as required by ... the Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard
and Recovery Act, with respect to a pension fund during the fiscal year for which
payment was budgeted and has failed to take action within that time period to make
required payments.
9. A municipality has sought to negotiate resolution or adjustment of a claim in excess
of 30% against a fund or budget and has failed to reach an agreement with creditors.
10. A municipality has filed a municipal debt readjustment plan pursuant to Chapter
9 of the Bankruptcy Code.
11. The municipality has experienced a decrease in a quantified level of municipal
service from the preceding fiscal year which has resulted from the municipality
reaching its legal limit in levying real estate taxes for general purposes.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.201 (Supp. 1993).
13. Boroughof Dupont v. Department of Community Affairs, 595 A.2d 688 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1991) (holding that Section 201 criteria merely indicate financial distress and do not mandate
declaration of "distressed" status).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.221 (Supp. 1993). The DCA has given only four
coordinators the responsibility of developing financial plans: The Pennsylvania Economy League,
The Local Government Research Corporation, the law firm of Eckert, Seanans, Cherin & Mellott,
and Public Financial Management. LOCAL GOV'T COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON THE GOV'T
OMNIBUS AMENDMENTS TO THE FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED MUNICIPALITIES ACT 4 [hereinafter
STAF REPORT].
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.246(Supp. 1993).
16. Id. § 11701.251. Under this section, the following funds may not be withheld from the
municipality: funds for capital projects under contracts in progress, funds relating to a declaration
of disaster resulting from a catastrophe, and pension fund disbursements made pursuant to state law.
Id.
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Upon the adoption of an approved plan, the municipality may
receive loans and grants administered out of a revolving fund, the central
form of assistance provided by the Act. 7 As of May 31, 1992, the
DCA had made interest-free loans in the amount of $4.7 million and
grants in the amount of $1.3 million to distressed municipalities. 18
Financial assistance is not available to all municipalities. First- and
second-class cities, as well as all counties, are precluded from obtaining
loans or grants.19 Philadelphia, as the State's only first-class city, and
Pittsburgh, as the State's only second-class city, are the only
municipalities affected by this exception, which was created because of
the limited amount of funds appropriated by the legislature.' In
addition to the DCA, other interested parties may petition to have a
municipality given distressed status, including the governing body of a
municipality upon a majority vote, a creditor owed more than $10,000,
or 10% of the municipality's employees who have not been paid in 30
days or more.2'
A distressed municipality is not entirely reliant on the State. When
denied state assistance, a municipality may file a Municipal Debt
Adjustment action under Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code.2 In taking such action, the municipality is automatically given
distressed status, bypassing the DCA screening.' The advantages to
seeking Chapter 9 protection enable a municipality to keep all creditors
in one forum and to automatically stay all pending lawsuits.' The
17. Id. §§ 11701.301-.303.
18. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 5.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.303 (Supp. 1993). A first-class city has a population of
more than one million people. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 101 (Supp. 1993). A second-class city
has a population between 500,000 and one million people. Id.
20. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 14 at 3.
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.202 (Supp. 1993). The Borough of Dupont is one
community that sought to bring itself within the scope of the Act by demonstrating that it met four
of the eleven criteria. Borough of Dupont v. Department of Community Affairs, 595 A.2d 688 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991). For a list of these elements, see supra note 12. At a public hearing, evidence
showed that Dupont was able to extricate itself from its financial troubles, resulting in a denial of
Dupont's petition by the Secretary of the DCA. Borough of Dupont, 595 A.2d at 690, 692. Dupont
then sought judicial relief, but the court held that any determination should be left to the discretion
of the Secretary. Id. at 692.
22. Requirements and procedures for filing Municipal Debt Adjustment actions are specifically
set out in 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (1987).
23. LOCAL GOV'T COMM'N, REPORT ON MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL DISTRESS - BACKGROUND
AND LEGISLATIVE REMEDY, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1988 at 13 (1987) [hereinafter
REPORT ON MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL DISTRESS].
24. James E. Spiotto, Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, in THE PROBLEMS OF INDENTURE
TRUSTEES AND BONDHOLDERS 1992: DEFAULTED BONDS AND BANKRUPTCY 611, 642 (Practising
Law Institute, 1992).
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disadvantages include the potentially exorbitant legal fees and the stigma
of bankruptcy.' The Borough of Shenandoah was the first
Pennsylvania municipality to choose Chapter 9 protection instead of Act
47 relief, believing that Act 47 restrictions would have tied the borough's
hands in making its own decisions. 6  The borough's petition was
dismissed, however, and Shenandoah was then granted distressed status
by the DCA.27
Act 47 has remained the option of choice among troubled
municipalities, perhaps because of its many other beneficial provisions.
In addition to the loans, grants, and financial planning assistance
available, a municipality has the right to petition the court of common
pleas for a tax increase above the maximum rates provided by law.'
The Act also enables neighboring municipalities to merge in order to
create a more viable economic unit.29 In all, the legislation provides
the municipality with many support and self-help mechanisms.'
While Act 47 provides much needed relief to certain municipalities,
it has brought on the wrath of labor unions. Municipal employees have
generally been forced to bear the brunt of the financial restructuring
required by the Act because plans have generally called for wage freezes
and slashes in benefits in an attempt to establish fiscal stability.31 The
next section analyzes the challenges labor unions have made to Act 47
and the consistently unsympathetic responses given by the Pennsylvania
courts.
25. Id. For a closer look at the viability of the bankruptcy option available to small
municipalities, see infra text accompanying notes 156-159.
26. Scott Aiges, Shenandoah Files for Chapter IX Protection, States News Serv., Apr. 20,
1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
27. STATUS REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.123(c)(Supp. 1993).
29. Id. §§ 11701.401-.409. The process of merger derives from Derry Township Supervisors
v. Borough of Hummelston, 326 A.2d 342 (Pa. 1974), the leading case on this procedure. Since
Act 47 requires mutual consent before two municipalities can merge, attempts to merge have been
generally unsuccessful because a solvent municipality naturally does not want to carry the burden
of another municipality. For a discussion of solutions to this problem, see infra notes 153-54 and
surrounding text.
30. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 11701.101-.501 (Supp. 1993).
31. See generally, COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS, supra note 7, at app. 2 (summarizing
factors leading to fiscal distress in six distressed municipalities).
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III. Labor Challenges to Act 47
A. Constitutional Challenges to Act 47
In Wilkinsburg Police Officers Ass 'n v. Commonwealth,32 a police
officers' association brought suit seeking a declaration that Act 47
violated the Pennsylvania Constitution.33 The association challenged the
constitutionality of Act 47 on many grounds, the first of which alleged
that the Borough's recovery plan violated many provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement between the association and the
Borough.3 4 The court sustained the Commonwealth's demurrer to this
claim because the State was not a party to the collective bargaining
agreement
35
The association's second count alleged that the DCA's power to
withhold essential state funds ultimately allowed the coordinator to
determine the content of the plan, constituting an improper delegation of
fiscal authority in violation of Article III, Section 31 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.36 The court, however, sided with the State and held that
a state-appointed coordinator did not constitute the creation of a special
commission because the State has the right to delegate necessary
administrative details.37  The court further noted that the Borough
retained its decision-making authority through its power to reject the
plan.38
The association next argued that Act 47 violated Article III, Section
32(7) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which prohibits the enactment of
any "special law regulating labor. 0' The association's concern was
that the Act gave Wilkinsburg the indirect power to do what it could not
do directly: circumvent the collective bargaining rights of its employees
32. 564A.2d 1015 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
33. Id. at 1016. The Borough of Wilkinsburg and the Department of Community Affairs were
also named as Defendants.
34. Id. at 1017.
35. Id. at 1019.
36. Id. Article III, Section 31 provides that "[t]he General Assembly shall not delegate to any
special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere
with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise,
or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever." PA. CONST. art. III, § 31.
37. Wilkinsburg, 564 A.2d at 1019 (citing Evans v. West Norriton Township Mun. Auth., 87
A.2d 474 (Pa. 1952)).
38. Id. at 1020.
39. Article III, Section 32 provides that "[t]he General Assembly shall pass no local or special
law in any case which has been or can be provided for by general law and specifically the General
Assembly shall not pass any local or special law . . . regulating labor, trade, mining or
manufacturing. .. ." PA. CONST. art. III, § 32.
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by binding itself to a strict recovery plan.4  The court applied a
rational basis test and found that the Act had a rational relationship to the
valid State purpose of assisting one of its financially distressed
municipalities.4 In sum, Act 47 withstood every constitutional
challenge brought by the association. The next section analyzes labor's
alternative argument that Act 47 conflicts with the collective bargaining
rights of police officers and fire fighters.
B. Act 47 and the Right of Policemen and Firemen to Bargain
Collectively
Passed pursuant to Article III, Section 31 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution,42 Act 111 expressly gives police and fire associations the
right to collectively bargain.43 However, section 252 of Act 47 states
that a collective bargaining agreement executed after the adoption of a
plan shall not in any manner violate the provisions of the plan." In
Wilkinsburg, the police officers' association argued that Act 47 violated
its right under Act 111 to bargain collectively with the municipality.45
The association argued that Act 111 compelled mandatory collective
bargaining, while the Commonwealth argued that the legislature intended
section 252 to be an amendment to Act 111, suggesting that the
legislature was constitutionally authorized to limit police officers'
40. Wilkinsburg, 564 A.2d at 1021. Act 47 provides that "[a] collective bargaining agreement
or arbitration settlement executed after the adoption of a plan shall not in any manner violate, expand
or diminish its provisions." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.252 (Supp. 1993).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1020. Article III, Section 31 provides:
Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation or any other provision of the Constitution, the
General Assembly may enact laws which provide that the findings of panels or
commissions, selected and acting in accordance with law for . . . collective bargaining
between policemen and firemen and their public employers shall be binding upon all
parties and shall constitute a mandate to the head of the political subdivision which is the
employer ....
PA. CONST. art. III, § 31.
43. Act 111 states that:
Policemen or firemen employed by a political subdivision of the Commonwealth or by
the Commonwealth shall, through labor organizations or other representatives designated
by fifty percent or more of such policemen or firemen, have the right to bargain
collectively with their public employers concerning the terms and conditions of their
employment, including compensation, hours, working conditions, retirement, pensions
and other benefits, and shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their
grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 217.1 (1991).
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.252 (Supp. 1993). See note 40, supra, for the text of
section 252.
45. Wilkinsburg, 564 A.2d at 1017.
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statutory rights to collective bargaining.' The court agreed with the
State, holding that the Constitution permits but does not require the
General Assembly to enact a law such as Act 111 and that the legislature
was therefore authorized to limit police officers' statutory rights to
collective bargaining.'
The conflict between Act 47 and Act 111 was relitigated in much
greater detail in FOP Lodge No. 34 v. City of Farrell." Farrell had
been declared financially distressed in 1987 and had adopted a recovery
plan effective through 1990. 49 In 1989, a board of arbitrators, assigned
to create a collective bargaining agreement between the City of Farrell
and the FOP, awarded an annual salary increase of $1,000 to the police
officers.50 Farrell challenged the award, claiming that the recovery
plan restricted increases in labor costs to approximately 2.5% per
year.5' The trial court looked deeper into the plan and found language
binding the City to no increases in either base pay or fringe benefits until
1991.52 The court therefore held that the arbitrator's award was illegal
as a violation of Act 47, section 252.53
On appeal, the FOP argued that section 252 of Act 47 only
prohibited salary increases that violated the recovery plan.' It further
argued that the language relied on by the trial court was only a
recommendation in the plan and as such did not constitute a directive to
Farrell to keep labor costs within a certain limit.55 The court found that
the recovery plan was devoid of any specific references to labor costs
and that there was no proof that the award violated, expanded or
diminished any provision of the plan.56 In remanding the case, the
court directed the trial court to determine what revenues were available,
the priorities established for the use of these funds by the city, and the
effect of the award on these priorities in order to find whether the award
46. Id. at 1020. For an evaluation of Act 111, see Kurt H. Donecker, Assessing
Pennsylvania's Police and Fire Collective Bargaining as Its Silver Anniversary Approaches, 29 DUQ.
L. REv. 695 (1991).
47. Wilkinsburg, 564 A.2d at 1020.
48. 590 A.2d 1327 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
49. Id. at 1329. The State responded with a six-month interest-free loan of $651,000. Id. at
n.3.
50. Id. at 1328.
51. Id. at 1330.
52. City of Farrell, 590 A.2d at 1330.
53. Id. at 1331.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1333.
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actually violated the recovery plan.57 Thus, in the absence of
restrictions in the plan, the burden of showing a violation of section 252
lies with the municipality. 8
The labor unions' challenges to Act 47 have all failed. In part, this
reflects the careful drafting of the legislation by the General Assembly,
which looked to the plans of other states when drafting Act 47.59 It
also reveals the court's recognition of the severe problems and potential
chaos generated by a collapsed municipality and the need for a viable
recovery plan.
While Act 47 has survived its legal battles, its stated goal of
instilling fiscal integrity has been less than successful: a program
evaluation reported little improvement in the underlying fiscal conditions
of distressed municipalities.' The report concluded that the declining
tax and economic bases of most of the jurisdictions suggests serious
problems which cannot be fixed by the management solutions of Act
47.6t The report rather ominously added that the "State does not
currently have the means to address" the deep-rooted problems of
distressed municipalities2 This Comment will next address the
57. City of Farrell, 590 A.2d at 1333. A strong dissent agreed with the majority that the
award had not been shown to violate the plan, but disagreed with the need to remand the case. Id.
(Kelley, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that because the plan had included other specific
recommendations, the coordinator had the opportunity to include recommendations prohibiting or
limiting salary increases but chose not to do so. Id. at 1335. The dissent's hostility towards the
City and the coordinator derives from the City's use of Act 47 to avoid participation in the collective
bargaining agreement. The dissent stated that "a public employer may not hide behind self-imposed
legal restrictions." Id. at 1333 (citing City of Washington v. Police Dep't of Washington, 259 A.2d
437, 442 (Pa. 1969)).
58. Both City of Farrell and Wilkinsburg demonstrate the need for distressed municipalities to
limit their expenditures by cutting back on wage payments. Act 47 also grants authority to the
municipality to raise revenues through an increase in taxes. The act provides that a "[municipality]
may petition the court of common pleas of the county in which the municipality is located to increase
its rates of taxation for earned income, real property, or both, beyond maximum rates provided by
law." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.123(c) (Supp. 1993). Section 123(c) of the Act provides
relief from the Local Tax Enabling Act which limits taxes on wages to one percent. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53 § 6908(3) (Supp. 1993). The City of Clairton utilized this provision after being
declared distressed when it petitioned the common pleas court to approve a tax increase on the
earned income of residents and non-residents from 1% to 1.5%. In re Petition of the City of
Clairton, 590 A.2d 838 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991). The United Steel Workers of America Local No.
1557 intervened, alleging that increasing the tax on nonresidents was unconstitutional, but the court
rejected most of their claims as untimely and held that the municipality had met its burden of
proving the need for the increase. Id. at 839-41.
59. See generally supra note 10.
60. See COPING wITH FISCAL DISTRESS, supra note 7 at 22. The study interpreted data from
six ailing municipalities before and after the implementation of Act 47.
61. See COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS, supra note 7, at 23.
62. See COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS, supra note 7, at 23.
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General Assembly's response to the fiscal problems of Philadelphia, the
State's largest municipality.
IV. The Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperative Authority Act
of 1991 (Act 6)63
A. Summary of Philadelphia's Financial Crisis
Municipal distress has not been limited to small communities in
Pennsylvania. The same problems of shrinking tax bases and increasing
costs that have afflicted the State's municipalities have hit Philadelphia
on a much larger scale.' Social problems such as crime, drugs,
homelessness and AIDS that plague all of society are especially
concentrated in large cities such as Philadelphia, where the tax base and
revenues have decreased because of a slumping regional economy.65
The population has dropped from 2.1 million in 1950 to 1.6 million in
1990 because of the decline in manufacturing and the emigration of the
middle class.' Fiscal mismanagement and reduced federal aid have
also contributed to the problem.67 The result of these factors, as of
1990, was a deficit of 1.3 billion dollars.68 Philadelphia also earned the
title of a "junk bond" city when financial services rated the city's debt
below investment grade.6'
While Philadelphia was obviously in need of assistance, the State all
too willingly turned its back on the City of Brotherly Love. Referring
to the fiscal mismanagement prevalent in the City, one state
representative warned against "flush[ing] some more of the State's
dollars down the toilet of Philadelphia. 70 But when it became apparent
in early 1991 that the City was going to default on its bond payments by
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 12720.101-.709(Supp. 1993).
64. Cooney, supra note 3, at 1.
65. Cooney,supra note 3, at 1.
66. Cooney, supra note 3, at 2.
67. Peter Cooney, Philadelphia Bailout Bill Signed Into Law, Reuter Bus. Rep., June 5, 1991,
at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
68. Cooney, supra note 3 at 2.
69. The specific legislative findings on this point are provided in section 103 of Act 6:
(2) That the financial difficulties have caused cities of the first class to lose an
investment-grade credit rating and direct access to capital markets.
(3) That it is critically important that cities of the first class achieve an investment-
grade credit rating and thereafter maintain their creditworthiness.
(4) That, without the ability to enter the capital markets, cities of the first class may
face a fiscal emergency that could render them unable to pay their obligations when
due and deliver essential services to their citizens.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.103(2)-(4)(Supp. 1993).
70. [199111 LEGIS. J.--HOUSE 612 (Statement of Rep. Chadwick).
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June of that year because of a severe cash shortage, the State was forced
to take action to avoid watching its largest city go bankrupt.7
B. Legislative Solutions
An early solution suggested by the Auditor General included the
amendment of Act 47 to include Philadelphia within the scope of the
Act's authority.72 This possibility was quickly dismissed because the
City's needs went far beyond the provisions of Act 47.73 The City's
deficit is 260 times larger than the entire revolving fund of Act 47.74
The Legislature began as it did with Act 47: by looking to the
solutions implemented in other cities.7 When New York City faced a
budget crisis in 1975, that State's legislature responded by creating the
Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC), an independent organization
designed to manage the city's finances.76 The major function of MAC
is to issue bonds for the city's benefit.' In addition to having the power
to issue bonds for the city, MAC has the authority to veto labor contracts
that are inconsistent with the financial plan.78 New York, however, has
71. The legislature justified involving the State in the problems of Philadelphia through the
following legislative findings:
(5) That, due to the economic and social interrelationship between among all citizens
in our economy, the fiscal integrity of cities of the first class is a matter of concern to
residents of the entire Commonwealth, and the financial problems of such cities have
a direct and negative effect on the entire Commonwealth.
(6) That, because cities of the first class consume a substantial portion of
Pennsylvania's farms, factories, manufacturing plants and service enterprises,
economic difficulties confronting cities of the first class detrimentally affect the
economy of the Commonwealth as a whole and become a matter of Statewide concern.
(7) That, because residents of cities of the first class contribute a substantial proportion
of all Commonwealth tax revenues, a disruption of the economic and social life of such
cities may have a significant detrimental effect upon Commonwealth revenues.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.103(5)-(7) (Supp. 1993).
72. Hafer Wants Audit on Philadelphia Aid, UPI, Oct. 11, 1990, at 1, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library.
73. Id.
74. According to one estimate, the City's deficit was 1.3 billion dollars. See Cooney, supra
note 3 at 2. Only $5,000,000 was appropriated by the General Assembly for Act 47's revolving
fund. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.501 (Supp. 1993).
75. Cooney, supra note 3, at 1. See also, Hugh Bronstein, Election Not to Affect Progress of
Bill, UPI, May 20, 1991, at 2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
76. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 3030-3040 (Consol. 1988). "The legislature.. . declares that
it is necessary for a municipal assistance corporation to be created to assist the city of New York
in providing essential services . . . and in creating investor confidence ... so that [the city] may
retain its ability to sell its obligations to the public." Id. § 3031.
77. Id. § 3033 (granting MAC the power to issue up to ten billion dollars worth of bonds).
78. Bronstein,supra note 75, at 2. See also, [199111 LEGIS. J.--HOUSE 613 (remarks of Rep.
Hagarty); Andrew W. Lehren, PICA's Test Looms as City Readies Attack of Finances,
PHILADELPHIA Bus. J., Feb. 3, 1992, § 1, at 1.
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no counterpart to Article III, Section 31 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
which serves to balance the powers of the State and its municipalities ."
Thus, MAC has greater power than any state-created authority would in
Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania General Assembly chose
to create a separate authority with restrictions on its powers because of
the large revenues created by a bond issuance.'
As stated, the goal of the Pennsylvania General Assembly was to
help the City access capital markets without getting the State entangled
in Philadelphia's fiscal troubles."' To this end, the Legislature passed
the 100-page Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperative Authority Act
for Cities of the First Class in 1991 (Act 6).1 This legislation created
an oversight authority, the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation
Authority (PICA),8 3 to provide financial assistance to Philadelphia, the
State's only first class city. The Act enables PICA to issue bonds and
divert the revenues to the City to be used for debt payments, cash
shortages, and other fiscal needs.'
79. See supra note 42.
80. Philadelphia receives its power through its home rule charter, approved in 1949 by the
General Assembly:
[T]he City of Philadelphia ... shall have and may exercise all powers and authority of
local self-government and shall have complete powers of legislation and administration
in relation to its municipal functions, including any additional powers and authority which
may hereafter be granted to it. The City shall have the power to enact ordinances and
to make rules and regulations necessary and proper for carrying into execution its powers
351 PA. CODE § 1.1-100 (1992). The power to create a home rule charter is granted by the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which states that "[miunicipalities shall have the right and power to frame
and adopt home rule charters .... A municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any
power or perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter, or by the
General Assembly at any time." PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2. The result of the charter is to prevent
the General Assembly from interfering with any of the matters coming within the scope of the City's
powers. Id. While the legislature is interfering with Philadelphia's operations through the
implementation of Act 6, it does so only at the request of the City, and therefore the will of the State
is not being imposed upon the municipality. See generally PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 12720.101-
.709 (Supp. 1993). For an in depth discussion of home rule, see WILLIAM D. VALENTE, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 103-47 (1987).
81. The legislature intended to "create an authority that will enable cities of the first class to
access capital markets for deficit elimination and seasonal borrowings to avoid default on existing
obligations and chronic cash shortages that will disrupt the delivery of municipal services ..
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.102(b)(1)(ii)(Supp. 1993).
82. Id. §§ 12720.101-.709.
83. The Act specifies that "[a] body corporate and politic to be known as the Pennsylvania
Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority is hereby created as a public authority and instrumentality
of the Commonwealth, exercising public powers of the Commonwealth as an agency and
instrumentality thereof." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.201 (Supp. 1993).
84. Seeid. §§ 12720.101-.709.
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Because the main component of the solution is the sale of bonds, the
General Assembly had to draft legislation that satisfied the doubts and
insecurities of investors.' Any possibility of legal challenges to the
authority or the ability of Philadelphia to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy
would ward off investors and make the bonds unmarketable .' The
resulting legislation attempts to give the Authority maximum power
without violating the consfitution. In order to create tight legislation, the
drafters looked to the lessons learned from the legal challenges to Act
47.87
Act 47 and Act 6 have the same basic framework, both requiring
long-term financial plans that must be approved before any assistance is
received, with the same suspension of state funding if the plan is not
approved."8 Act 6, however, is not administered by the State's
Department of Community Affairs, but by PICA, an independent
authority created by the State. 9 PICA consists of five board members,
with the Governor and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate
and House each appointing one member. 9' In creating this authority,
the State succeeded in distancing itself from the Philadelphia fiasco and
in establishing an entity that has the wherewithal to issue bonds, a power
beyond the scope of the DCA. 9'
Another difference is that the financial plan is created by the
troubled City, unlike the Act 47 situation in which the DCA-appointed
coordinator creates the financial plan.' This was done for legal and
practical reasons. Besides the practical reasons of the complexity of
Philadelphia's budget and the short time frame, having the City develop
its own plan reduces the force of the argument presented in the
Wilkinsburg case, which challenged the use of the coordinator's plan as
an unconstitutional delegation of the municipality's fiscal authority.'
85. See generally, Moody's Issues Comment on Philadelphia, PR Newswire, June 20, 1991,
at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
86. Lehren, supra note 78, at 3 ("A courtroom fight undertaken before PICA sells its bonds
could delay a sale, frighten away investors and worsen Philadelphia's out-of-whack finances.").
87. See generally, Lehren, supra note 78 at 1.
88. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 11701.101-.501 (Supp. 1993)with PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53 §§ 12720.101-.709 (Supp. 1993).
89. See supra note 83.
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.202 (Supp. 1993).
91. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of the DCA.
92. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.209 (Supp. 1993) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53
§ 11701.221(a), (d) (Supp. 1993).
93. Wilkinsburg Police Officers Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 564 A.2d 1015, 1019 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1989).
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Act 6 contains a significant restriction on the first-class city that is
not applied by Act 47 to municipalities. Section 211 prohibits the City
from filing a petition for relief under Chapter 9 of federal bankruptcy
law.' This prohibition became necessary because of the bond issuance
not present in the Act 47 scenario and the use of outside investors, who
would be deterred from investing in a troubled city that could seek
protection from all of its creditors under Chapter 9.91 The legislature
also added one final clause to avoid lengthy litigation of the Act.'
Section 702 provides that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has "exclusive
jurisdiction to hear any challenge to or to render a declaratory judgment
concerning the constitutionality of this act . . . . " The next section
specifically addresses the collective bargaining clauses of Act 6, which
constitute the most significant portion of the legislation in the eyes of
labor unions.
C. Collective Bargaining Clauses
Largely in response to the litigation over Act 47, the legislature was
much more thorough in drafting the collective bargaining section of Act
6. The language of Act 47 is very strong: "A collective bargaining
agreement or arbitration settlement executed after the adoption of a plan
shall not in any manner violate, expand or diminish its provisions."98
The language of Act 6 is softer and states that a collective bargaining
agreement not in compliance with a plan "shall not be void or voidable
solely by reason of such noncompliance," but the City will have to
resubmit a plan explaining where the funds are going to come from.99
City of Farrell and Wilkinsburg demonstrated how a stringent clause
could be challenged by Act 111, the Policemen and Firemen Collective
Bargaining Act."°
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.211 (a) (Supp. 1993). The applicable federal bankruptcy
law is 11 U.S.C. § 9 (1987). In addition, if there are no longer any bonds outstanding, a city of
the first class must obtain approval in writing from the governor before any petition for relief may
be filed. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.211(b) (Supp. 1993). One of the governor's
responsibilities is to make sure that the petition is not an unjust attempt by the city to evade payment
on its contractual obligations. Id. § 12720.211 (c). The provision of Act 47 granting the right to
file for bankruptcy is PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.262 (Supp. 1993).
95. See David L. Dubrow, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Viable Option for
Municipalities in Fiscal Crisis?, 24 URB. LAW. 539, 544 (1992).
96. See generally, Lehren, supra note 78, at 3.
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.702 (Supp. 1993).
98. Id. § 11701.252 (Supp. 1993).
99. Id. § 12720.2096)(2) (Supp. 1993).
100. See supra part III.B for a discussion of these cases and an analysis of Act 47 with respect
to Act 111.
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Act 6 also explicitly states, where Act 47 only implies, that the Act
in no way affects collective bargaining agreements already in place.101
Lastly, in an effort to express the importance of the financial plan, Act
6 places certain duties on the board of arbitration reviewing the employee
contract.l" If a board of arbitration awards a wage or benefit increase
in excess of the allotment provided for in the plan, the board must state
in writing that it has considered the plan and the ability of the city to pay
the cost of the increase without affecting the level of service provided for
in the plan. 3 The board must also state in detail all of the factors it
took into account when reaching its decision."°  The legislature
intended that all of these changes and additions in the collective
bargaining clause and throughout the entire Act would make the Act
resistant to challenge and therefore make the bonds more marketable. 5
After much debate in both the House and the Senate, the Act finally
passed on June 5, 1991. I° The Act included a provision allowing the
City to defer its payments into the employee pension fund. °7 This
deferral was necessary as an immediate solution to the cash flow problem
of the City, which faced debt payments that summer. 18 Mayor
Rendell of Philadelphia then began to formulate a five-year plan, with the
City's labor unions bearing the brunt of the reform. 9  Rendell
released his five-year plan on February 20, 1992, calling for $508
million in labor concessions through a four-year wage freeze, significant
cuts in holidays and sick time, and an overhaul of the health benefit
program."I Philadelphia's four major unions filed suit that same day
seeking to dismantle the oversight authority."' On March 5, 1992 the
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.2090)(1)(Supp. 1993).
102. Id. § 12720.209(k)(1). Notably, these provisions are very similar to those set forth by the
court in City of Farrell. See supra text accompanying note 57.
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.209(k)(1)(Supp. 1993).
104. Id. § 12720.209(k)(2).
105. See generally Dubrow, supra note 95, at 544 for a discussion of the impact of creditors'
fears, especially with regard to the threat of bankruptcy, on the marketability of municipal bonds.
106. Cooney, supra note 67, at 1. The Senate passed an amended version of the House bill by
a 30-17 vote, and the House approved the Senate amendments the following day by a 123-80 vote.
Id. at 2.
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.705(c) (Supp. 1993).
108. See Matthew Purdy, Pension Fund Gets a Short Check: Unions Vow Suits to Get Millions
Due, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 2, 1991, at BI.
109. According to one estimate, the unions suffered 45% of the cutbacks. Steve Dickson,
Philadelphia Plan for Fiscal Recovery Comes Hours After Unions File Lawsuit, BOND BUYER, Feb.
21, 1992, at 2.
110. Marc Duvoisin et. al., Since January, Unions Have Fought Rendell's Efforts to Rein Them
In, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 6, 1992, at A6.
111. See Dickson, supra note 109, at 1. Philadelphia's major unions are the American
Federation of State and County Municipal Employees (AFSCME) District Council 33, representing
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City Council voted on and unanimously approved the Mayor's plan.1 2
Approximately one month later, the oversight authority also approved
it.' '13
V. Labor Challenges to Act 6
A. Overview
The suit filed by the unions was the last thing the City or PICA
wanted. While they had full confidence in the constitutionality of Act 6,
both realized that this challenge could scare off investors at worst and at
least slow down the process of issuing the bonds and funneling the
proceeds into the coffers of the City." 4 The inclusion of Section 702
into Act 6 granting exclusive jurisdiction to Pennsylvania's supreme
court proved valuable." 5 The supreme court heard the arguments on
April 7, 1992.116 The City had requested a quick decision in its briefs
and arguments because of the urgent need for the bond proceeds." 7
The court cooperated by issuing a one-sentence ruling a week later
upholding the constitutionality of the legislation, stating that it would
explain its reasoning at a later date." 8 This ruling cleared the way for
the bond sale on June 2, 1992, which raised $474.5 million in
revenue. " 9  The actual opinion was not released until July 8,
1992,12° which, if not for the preliminary statement, would have
delayed the issuance by at least two months.
The labor challenge, which represented the combined efforts of the
city's two uniformed unions and the two non-uniformed unions,
presented some of the same issues addressed in the earlier Act 47
litigation and also put forth two new challenges.
the city's blue-collar workers; AFSCME District Council 47, representing the city's white and grey
collar workers; International Association of Fire Fighters' Local 22; and Fraternal Order of Police
Lodge 5. Fire Fighters and FOP File Suit Against PICA Law, PR Newswire, Feb. 20, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
112. Duvoisin, supra note 110, at A6.
113. Duvoisin, supra note I10, at A6.
114. Lehren, supra note 78 at 3.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 96, 97.
116. Local22 v. Commonwealth, 613 A.2d 522 (Pa. 1992).
117. See Dickson, supra note 109, at 2.
118. Steve Dickson, Court Challenge to Oversight Board For Philadelphia Swiftly Dismissed,
BOND BUYER, April 15, 1992, at 1.
119. Dale Russakoff, City's Comeback Tests Workers' Brotherly Love, WASH. POST, June 7,
1992 at A3.
120. Local 22, 613 A.2d at 522.
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B. The Constitutional Challenges to Act 6
The unions first claimed that Act 6 violated Article II, Section 1 and
Article IV, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because the PICA
Board was unconstitutionally appointed.' They alleged that because
four of the members are appointed by the legislators and only one by the
governor, Act 6 violated the separation of powers doctrine by placing the
executive powers of the board in the hands of the legislative branch of
the government.'" The court began its analysis of all of the
constitutional challenges presented by the unions by stating generally that
the court's review is based "upon a strong presumption of
constitutionality.9'123  The court dismissed the first claim for lack of
standing because the unions had failed to show how their interests were
affected by the means in which the board members were appointed. 4
The unions next alleged that PICA, created by Section 201 of Act
6, constituted a "special commission" in violation of Article III, Section
31. '1 The unions argued that the General Assembly had delegated to
PICA the power to intervene with the workings of the City. 12 6 While
this claim resurrected arguments made in Wilkinsburg and City of
Farrell,'I7 the unions had a stronger case because PICA was clearly a
special commission, unlike the DCA which was merely a branch of the
state government. The court found this point irrelevant, however, and
held that PICA did not interfere with the municipal government of
Philadelphia." Because the City requested assistance and voluntarily
entered into the cooperative agreement with the authority, the court held
that PICA was not imposing its will on the municipality.2 9
Furthermore, the court stated that Article III must be viewed in
conjunction with other provisions of the constitution, namely Article IX,
121. Id. at 525.
122. Id. This first allegation came in the form of a quo warranto action, which is designed to
test whether a person or entity exercising a power is legally entitled to do so. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1256 (6th ed. 1990). Generally brought by the Attorney General or the district
attorney, a private party may not bring a quo warranto action unless it demonstrates the cause of
the harm alleged. 613 A.2d at 525 (citing Snider v. Thornburgh, 436 A.2d 593, 600 (Pa. 1981)).
123. Local 22, 613 A.2d at 525. "[L]egislation will not be deemed unconstitutional unless it
clearly, plainly and palpably violates some specific mandate or prohibition of the constitution." Id.
(citing Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358, 1362 (Pa. 1986)).
124. Local 22, 613 A.2d at 526.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra part III for a discussion of these cases.
128. Local 22, 613 A.2d at 526.
129. Id.
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Section 5, which enables the City to enter into such agreements. 30
Thus, the court concluded that the second claim was without merit.1
C. Act 6 and the Collective Bargaining Rights of the Unions
Although the court consolidated their suits, the uniformed and non-
uniformed unions brought different claims regarding the violation of their
collective bargaining rights because the two groups received their rights
to bargain collectively under two different statutes.'32 The police and
fire unions alleged that Act 6 infringed on their rights granted under Act
111,133 while the non-uniformed employees union challenged the state's
ability to assist its municipalities."
1. Police and Fire Union Claims.-Because the Wilkinsburg and
City of Farrell cases had already determined that the legislature could
amend Act 111 through subsequent legislation,'35 the police and fire
unions tried to present a new twist on this claim. They attacked section
209(k)(3)(i), which allows any party before a board of arbitration to
appeal to a court of common pleas to review the board's findings as to
the city's ability to pay.'36 The unions argued that this subsection
unlawfully permits the interference of a third party, the court, in
arbitration proceedings. 37  Ironically, this section was an amended
version of the more restrictive collective bargaining clause in Act 47 that
the courts had already upheld. 138  The legislature, by spelling out the
rights of all the parties involved, had hoped to avoid this very situation.
The court interpreted Act 6 in the same manner as the courts in
130. Id. Article 9, section 5 states:
A municipality by act of its governing body may, or upon being required by initiative and
referendum in the area affected shall, cooperate or agree in the exercise of any function,
power or responsibility with, or delegate or transfer any function, power or responsibility
to, one or more other governmental units including other municipalities or districts, the
Federal government, any other state or its governmental units, or any newly created
governmental unit.
PA. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (1969).
131. Local 22, 613 A.2d at 526.
132. The right of the police officers and fire fighters to bargain collectively derives from PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §§ 217.1-.10 (1991), known as Act 111. The rights of non-uniformed public
employees to bargain collectively is derived from the Public Employee Relations Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43 §§ 1101.101-.2301 (1991), known as Act 195.
133. Local 22, 613 A.2d at 526.
134. Id. at 527.
135. See supra part III.B for discussion of previous litigation of Act 111 in relationship to Act
47.
136. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.209(k)(3)(i)(Supp. 1993).
137. Local 22, 613 A.2d at 527.
138. SeePA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.252(Supp. 1993).
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Wilkinsburg and Farrell had interpreted Act 47 and declared that Article
III, Section 31 did not prohibit the modification of Act 111.139
2. Challenge From the Non-Uniformed Unions.-The rights of the
City's blue-collar and white-collar employees to bargain collectively is
derived from the Public Employee Relations Act, known as Act 195.1
40
The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) alleged that Act 6, by requiring the City to demonstrate to
PICA the viability of any collective bargaining agreement before any
assistance could be received, amounted to economic coercion and
therefore violated the good faith bargaining clause of Act 195.141
AFSCME's argument, however, merely rehashed the same argument put
forth by the police officers' association in Wilkinsburg 42 The court
held that these requirements did not impede the ability of the City to
negotiate its own collective bargaining agreements. 143
In upholding the constitutionality of Act 6, the court also upheld the
right of the State to aid its troubled municipalities. As the court stated,
"[i]t would be anomalous, indeed, if the Pennsylvania Constitution were
to prevent the legislature from assisting financially distressed cities."'"
The unions continued their fight. At the unions' request, the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board assigned factfinders on June 26,
1992 to help resolve the labor dispute. 45 The City sued to have the
Board's decision overturned because it locked in the current contract
139. Local 22, 613 A.2d at 527. See supra part III for a analysis of the legality of Act 47.
140. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §§ 1101.101-.2301 (1991).
141. Local 22, 613 A.2d at 528. The union referred to § 5.07(b) of the Intergovernmental
Cooperative Agreement entered into by the City and the State pursuant to Act 6, which enables first
class cities to seek assistance from the State. The section states:
After the approval by the Authority of a Financial Plan submitted pursuant to the Act and
this Agreement, the City shall execute collective bargaining agreements in compliance
with such Financial Plan. If the City executes a collective bargaining agreement, or
receives an arbitration award... which is not in compliance with such Financial Plan,
neither such collective bargaining agreement nor such arbitration award shall be void or
voidable solely by reason of non-compliance, but the City shall as soon as practicable
.. . submit to the Authority a proposed revision to the Financial Plan which demonstrates
to the reasonable satisfaction of the Authority that revenues sufficient to pay the costs of
such collective bargaining agreement or such arbitration award, as the case may be, will
be available in the affected fiscal years of the Financial Plan.
Intergovernmental Cooperation Agreement by and between Pennsylvania Intergovernmental
Cooperation Authority and The City of Philadelphia, § 5.07(b), Jan. 8, 1992, at 45 (emphasis
'added).
142. Wilkinsburg, 564 A.2d at 1019; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
143. Local22, 613 A.2d at 529.
144. Id.
145. Duvoisin, supra note 110, at 6.
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terms for 60 days, barring the mayor from making any of the cuts
proposed in his plan."4 The supreme court held that the appointment
of factfinders was illegal because the governing statute prohibited any
appointment coming later than 130 days prior to the submission date. 47
In this situation, the factfinders were appointed almost three months after
the budget submission date.'4
In striking down the factfinding, the court forced the labor dispute
to a head. 49 On October 6, 1992, the non-uniformed employees went
on a strike that lasted only 14 hours."'5 The unions succeeded in
getting the wage freeze cut from four to two years, but had little other
success.'' While both Act 47 and Act 6 have withstood many legal
challenges, the true test of their strength is whether they can help solve
any of the critical financial problems facing the State's municipalities.
The next section of this Comment will discuss the adequacy of these acts
in addressing such problems.
VI. An Analysis of the Adequacy of the State's Response and
Additional Suggestions for Fiscal Recovery
A. Act 47
Labor can point to evidence which indicates that the problems of
municipalities have not disappeared through the implementation of anti-
labor programs, suggesting that wages are not the main problem and that
blame is wrongly placed on the unions.' While the municipal unions
have no doubt received more than their share of the blame, the unions
must accept the fact that wages are the major controllable element of a
municipal fiscal budget. A city council cannot negotiate with poverty,
crime or pestilence as it can with a union, since these social ills are
largely beyond the control of small municipal governments.
There is no easy solution to the problems facing small
municipalities, but Act 47 and its many provisions have the capability
and the strength to see the State's small municipalities through a fiscal
crisis. Giving the municipalities loans and grants provides short term
146. City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 614 A.2d 213 (Pa. 1992).
147. Id. at 214. The court relied on PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §§ 1101.801, .802 (1991).
148. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 614 A.2d at 214.
149. Duvoisin, supra note 110, at 6.
150. Duvoisin, supra note 110, at 6.
151. Duvoisin, supra note 110, at 6.
152. See COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS, supra, at 11; see also supra text accompanying notes
64-68.
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assistance, but as the early results indicate, municipal governments must
face the structural problems that loans cannot fix if they are to
rebound. 53  In addition to cutting back on wages and benefits,
municipalities must use the other powers granted in Act 47. Local
governments having distressed status need to invoke the tax provision
which allows them to raise taxes by up to 1.5%,154 regardless of the
political fallout that may result. While the resulting increase in revenue
cannot itself solve the problem, when combined with wage cuts, state
loans and grants, and improved fiscal responsibility, the distressed
municipality faces a much better chance of survival.
A municipality that has unsuccessfully attempted these changes, or
one whose future is so bleak that it needs to consider more drastic
solutions, must next consider the option of merger. Particularly
appropriate for communities gutted by the waning steel and coal
industries, the process of merger allows communities to pool their
resources and reduce expenditures by providing more efficient
services. 55  Unfortunately, there is little incentive for a solvent
municipality to merge with a fiscally distressed neighboring
township. 56 To combat this problem, the legislature should amend Act
47 to include incentives for consolidation. The legislature could give the
consolidated unit increased funding, special tax breaks and other perks
to encourage merger.
The final option for a distressed municipality is bankruptcy.'57
Municipal governments must avoid the inclination to view this option as
one to avoid at all costs because of the negative connotations associated
with the process. The stigma surrounding bankruptcy has begun to
subside because the number of corporations and small municipalities
filing for bankruptcy has been increasing.'58 A severely distressed
municipality must not wait too long before filing a bankruptcy petition
because the bankruptcy code's many provisions can best prevent a total
collapse of the government when they are quickly implemented. 59
153. See COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS supra note 7, at 12.
154. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.123(c)(Supp. 1993).
155. "Subsequentto consolidation or merger, the consolidated or merged municipality may, in
accordance with existing contracts or arbitration award provisions and consistent with applicable
laws, reduce the number of uniformed and nonuniformed employees to avoid overstaffing and
duplication of positions in the consolidated or merged municipality." Id. § 11701.408(b).
156. Seegenerally PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 11701.401-.423(Supp. 1993) for the requirements
of merger or consolidation.
157. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 11701.261-.263 (Supp. 1993) for the text of Act 47's
bankruptcy provisions.
158. Aiges, supra note 26, at 1.
159. See generally Dubrow, supra note 95.
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Bankruptcy enables a municipality to seek protection from its creditors
and provides other benefits that help prevent complete insolvency, such
as debt adjustment. 16°
Act 47 provides many options, and it is up to each distressed
municipality to determine which combination of alternatives should be
implemented and in which order. As a legislative remedy, Act 47
represents a viable solution to the fiscal problems of small communities
and the best assistance that the State could provide. While the State
stopped short of creating an independent oversight authority, as it did in
Act 6 for Philadelphia, such an authority would not have been useful to
the small municipalities. The main purpose of the authority is to issue
bonds to provide revenue for the City.1 61  This function is
accomplished in Act 47 through the loans and grants distributed through
the revolving fund, which provides enough funds to meet any short-term
obligations that the municipality may face. Throwing more money at the
problem through a bond issuance was therefore unnecessary as it would
only increase the small municipality's long-term debt.
B. Act6
While bankruptcy is an option for a small municipality, it would be
disastrous for the City of Philadelphia to seek protection under
bankruptcy law. The difference is that a large city like Philadelphia
depends on its good credit rating to sell bonds62 Reputation carries
much less importance with small municipalities because they generally
do not sell bonds. Thus, the General Assembly correctly focused on the
problem of maintaining access to capital markets when it passed Act
6. 163
One of the major weaknesses to be found in Act 6 concerns the
collective bargaining portion of the Act."6  In spite of the judicial
approval of the collective bargaining section of Act 47,165 the General
160. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (1987). See also supra text accompanying notes 22, 24-25.
161. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.102(b)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1993).
162. Detroit's recent problems illustrates the need to maintain a good credit rating. The city
recently had its credit rating dropped to noninvestment grade by Moody's Investors Service because
of its chronic debt problems arising from the rough economic times the city has experienced.
Barbara P. Noble, A Downgraded Detroit Cries Foul, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1992, at D1. This
decision will harm Detroit's ability to attract investors and its chances of a self-recovery. See
generally, id.
163. See supra note 69.
164. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.209(j-k) (Supp. 1993).
165. Act 47 prohibited any collective bargaining agreement from violating any provisions of the
financial plan. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.252 (Supp. 1993). When this section was litigated,
the court held that Act 47 constituted an amendment to Act 111, fully within the powers of the
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Assembly nonetheless toned down the language of the similar section in
Act 6 to the point where a city can accept any labor plan as long as it
demonstrates what other portions of the budget will be reduced."6 The
Act requires only that the board of arbitrators include in writing any
increases in wages or benefits above those levels set forth in the plan,
explaining that it considered the city's financial plan and the city's ability
to pay. 
67
While the legislature may have succeeded in making the legislation
less open to attack, it failed to make the bonds more marketable. The
fear that the authority would not have the power to control labor could
ward off investors even more than the fear of litigation. By softening its
approach, the legislature made the Act less susceptible to attack, but also
dulled the Act's teeth and likewise dulled the bonds' potential appeal to
investors.
Another major weakness of the Act is its failure to establish
guidelines by which the City could privatize many services that it
provides its citizens. The process of privatization, in which a city
contracts out public services to private companies instead of having its
own employees perform the work, can potentially save Philadelphia
millions of dollars each year."6 Privatization has been occurring all
over the country, but has met its toughest challenge in large cities like
New York and Philadelphia. 69 The belief is that private companies
can operate more efficiently than the City, potentially saving Philadelphia
at least $30 million per year in areas such as trash hauling, custodial
services and vehicle repairs.' 70
The legislature considered requiring the City to develop a
privatization plan before it could receive any aid, but the proposed
amendment was defeated.' 7' The plan would have required the City to
provide (1) a list of its nonessential activities that could be farmed out to
private companies to reduce the City's burden, and (2) a schedule by
which the City intended to delegate those responsibilities through a
General Assembly. Wilkinsburg Police Officers Assoc. v. Commonwealth, 564 A.2d 1015, 1020
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
166. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11701.252 (Supp. 1993) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53
§ 12720.2090) (Supp. 1993).
167. PA. STAT. ANN. it. 53 § 12720.209(k)(Supp. 1993).
168. Michael D. Hinds, Cash-Strapped Cities Turn to Companies to Do What Government Once
Did, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1991, at A12.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See [1991] 1 LEGIS. J--HOUSE 598.
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competitive bidding process." The proposed amendment limited the
privatization process to nonessential areas because essential areas, such
as those affecting the public health and welfare, were deemed "more
important than the benefits of free market competition. "
3
Municipal labor unions have understandably opposed privatization
plans which would result in layoffs in some areas. 74 But if the City
fails to improve its fiscal status, the result could be massive, across the
board layoffs affecting workers in essential as well as nonessential
areas.' 75 The former option seems much more palatable. While the
legislature has not included a privatization plan in Act 6, there is nothing
preventing the City from taking the initiative and implementing its own
policy of privatization as an additional element in its fiscal recovery plan.
Another problem with the solution proposed by Act 6 is not found
within the legislation itself, but rather is a fundamental problem with
state intervention. The State will have a difficult time accomplishing its
goal of maintaining an arms-length relationship with the City. To
illustrate, New York City's "temporary" oversight authority has been in
place since 1975.176 If this is any indication of PICA's future, the
State may have received more than it bargained for when it created PICA
for the initial bond issuance period of five years.177
Aside from the above weaknesses, Act 6 represents a tremendous
show of support from the State. But as the framework of Act 6 suggests,
there is only so much assistance that the State can provide.1
7  If
Philadelphia is to recover, it must view the state aid as a one-time elixir,
and not as a crutch upon which it can rely when problems arise. The
City can make significant internal changes in addition to cutting labor
costs. For example, replacing the City's outdated computer system can
save hundreds of thousands of dollars each year. 79 The inefficiencies
arising from political patronage, especially in the Parking Authority,
must also be corrected in spite of the resulting political price."s In
172. Id. at 595.
173. Id. at 596 (statement of Rep. Gladeck).
174. Hinds, supra note 168 at 2.
175. PENNSYLVANIA INTERGOVERNMENTALCOOPERATION AUTH., STAFF REPORT ON THE CITY
OF PHILADELPHIA'S FIVE YEAR FINANCIAL PLAN, June 4, 1992, at 11 ("reduction in employment
levels" is the reasonable alternative if the recovery plan fails).
176. N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW §§ 3030-3040(1988).
177. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12720.204 (Supp. 1993).
178. See generally id., §§ 12720.101-.709.
179. The current system cannot use computerized federal tax returns to determine who is
cheating the city, resulting in an inefficient revenue collection system. See Russakoff, supra note
119 at A3.
180. [1991] 1 LEGIS. J--SENATE 551 (Remarks of Sen. Fumo) ("the Philadelphia Parking
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addition, the process of privatization must be implemented to reduce the
waste and inefficiencies inherent in a large government.
Philadelphia must implement these changes and others like them to
become self-sufficient. The State has intervened to secure the credit-
rating of the city, but only the City can regain its good name and
reputation.
VII. Conclusion
The municipal employees and the unions representing them were in
a losing battle from the start. State intervention through Act 47 and Act
6 became necessary only because the municipalities were in dire straits.
If the unions successfully prevented the General Assembly from assisting
the cities, they would have only crippled their own long-term interests
in job stability and increasing wages and benefits. The status quo might
have been maintained had the unions succeeded in preventing the
municipalities from lowering their labor expenses, but only at the cost of
sending the municipalities into severe financial distress in the very near
future. The likely result would have been massive layoffs and, except for
Philadelphia, the possibility of bankruptcy. As it now stands, the
employees have been forced to accept wage and benefit concessions that
keep their city and their jobs intact.
The legislative remedies enacted by Pennsylvania's General
Assembly are only short-term solutions. State intervention into the fiscal
affairs of municipalities affects the autonomy of local governments and
alters the bargaining position of labor unions. Because the State is acting
for the good of the people, however, it is fully within its constitutional
powers to intervene. Like a parent, the Pennsylvania General Assembly
may provide guidance to avoid watching its municipalities make mistake
after mistake.
Drew Patrick Gannon
Authority is an agency rife with waste and political patronage"). See also Hugh Bronstein, Hafer
Calls for Intervention in Philadelphia's Woes, UPI, Mar. 27, 1991, at 1, available in, LEXIS, Nexis
Library (stating that Department of Licenses and Inspection and the Traffic Court had receivable
balances of $90 million).

